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Posted March 27, 2009 




The following comments are not intended to serve as a summary of last weekend’s proceedings.  
My remarks reflect only my idiosyncratic interests, and I have only commented on the first four 
papers.  
 
1. Kyle Stanford 
Kyle Stanford offered a criterion to distinguish scientific theories that are susceptible to the 
Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA) from those that are not.  This is important, because 
he does not want to be an anti-realist about all scientific hypotheses tout court.  One such 
hypothesis is that fossils have organic origins.  Kyle suggested that we should not be anti-realists 
about hypotheses for which we have projective inductive evidence; however, if we have merely 
abductive evidence for a hypothesis, then we should be anti-realists about it, since it is 
vulnerable to PUA. 
 
A question that Kyle heard (from others and me) is: what is the evidence that even projective 
induction is safe from the PUA?  Here is my form of the worry.  When we make a projective 
induction, we have to assume that our limited past evidence is relevantly similar to the whole 
population under investigation.  But we often don’t know whether our sample is relevantly 
similar to the entire population—we don’t know which variables are relevant, and furthermore 
we may not even know that certain relevant properties exist (for example, if such properties had 
not yet been discovered).  So it seems that even projective induction may not be safe from the 
PUA.  Kyle offered a response in his closing remarks: safety from the PUA may not be a binary 
matter—perhaps there is a continuum, in which projective inductions are more safe than mere 
abductions, but not immune simpliciter. 
 
2. David Harker 
David Harker presented a way to limit the damage purportedly done by strong 
underdetermination claims.  He focused on defending the realist claim that theories progress, and 
bracketed the question of whether theories are approximately true. 
 
The part of Harker’s proposal most interesting to me was the claim that his version of realism 
makes a prediction that cannot be had without assuming his version of realism: the parts of past 
theories responsible for empirical progress are preserved across subsequent episodes of theory 
change.  This was of particular interest to me, because I have argued that the no-miracles 
argument is, despite realists’ claims, an inference to a bad explanation, in part because adding 
(certain) realist theses to our current scientific theories generates no new predictions.1  Some 
audience members wondered whether this prediction really is borne out by the data (viz. the 
history of science).  I have another question: couldn’t/ wouldn’t the constructive empiricist make 
exactly the same prediction?  That is, why wouldn’t the constructive empiricist say that the parts 
of theories preserved across change are the very parts responsible for empirical success?  And if 
                                                
1 “The No Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation,” Philosophy of 
Science (forthcoming); draft: http://faculty.unlv.edu/frostarn/RealismLimitsOfExplanation.rtf 
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realism and anti-realism make the same prediction, then of course the fact that realism makes 
that prediction is no evidence for it over anti-realism. 
 
3. Dana Tulodziecki 
Dana Tulodziecki presented a nice case study on John Snow showing that scientists admit other 
rules and standards of theory-choice besides ‘save the phenomena,’ and that when these other 
rules and/or standards are considered, then it will be much more difficult for anti-realists to 
construct equally good theories. 
 
Looking back, I have two questions:  
(a) How does this proposal differ from or extend upon Laudan’s in “Demystifying 
Underdetermination,” where he suggests that if we allow ourselves canons of ampliative 
inference as well as deductive inference, then the apparent rivals to current theories will be 
eliminated?   
(b) For the sake of the argument, imagine that there is no underdetermination: we somehow 
manage to settle on some set of practices and standards for scientific reasoning such that for any 
body of evidence, there is one and only one extant theory that is most supported by it (put 
otherwise, imagine that there is a function from data sets to current theories that always picks out 
the most justified theory).  My question is: would this be any help against Stanford’s New 
Induction? 
 
4. John Norton 
I am also curious how John Norton would answer the above question (3.b) as well.  
 
Also, I wanted to register one difference of intuitions between John and me—though the fact that 
John has an intuition counter to my own makes me weight my own less.  He suggested that, in 
observational astronomy (c. 1543), Ptolemaic and Copernican models are merely notational 
variants of one another, or at least, all the differences between the two models are surplus 
structure.  I do not share this intuition.  Why?  I can see why gauge quantities, absolute position, 
absolute time, and absolute velocity can be viewed as surplus structure: there is an independently 
motivated picture of the natural world in which these entities do not appear.  There is not (c. 
1543) for the Ptolemaic and Copernican models.  I recognize and understand that, for the 
purposes of capturing the astronomical data within acceptable observational error in the 16th 
Century, the answer to the question ‘Is the Earth moving or not?’ can be either yes or no.  But 
that, an anti-realist should say, is exactly what we should expect in a paradigmatic case of 
underdetermination: the evidence available to us does not favor one hypothesis of the Earth’s 
motion over another.   
 
(This is in part why, during the Q&A, I asked for an independent characterization of surplus 
structure.  If Norton’s response to almost all examples of apparently equally well-confirmed 
rivals is ‘It feels like surplus structure to me,’ then the proponent of underdetermination will 
likely accuse Norton of defending his thesis from potential counter-evidence in an unmotivated, 
ad hoc way—analogous to anti-evolutionists denying transitional forms by declaring any 
apparently disconfirming instance, e.g. Archaeopteryx, to be a non-transitional form, e.g. a bird 
or a reptile.) 
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Posted March 27, 2009 
J. Brian Pitts 
Invited Discussion of  
Underdetermination in Science, 21-22 March 2009 
Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh 
 
 This is a personal summary of and response to the underdetermination workshop.  Given 
limits of space and my competence, I will not be able to comment on every talk.  The comments 
by Frost-Arnold remove that deficiency; I thank him for clarifying comments and questions also.  
 
 Some speakers, including Norton2 and Magnus,3 are skeptical about any global 
underdetermination problem in science.  Norton’s willingness to dismiss as frivolous such 
candidates as might be developed by gratuitous mutilation presupposes that we are rationally 
entitled to rather strong principles of inductive inference.  He finds that our shared judgments of 
particular warranted inductive inferences apparently irreparably outstrip those that can be 
justified through serious arguments, however.4  A plausible response to this situation might be to 
adopt a (partly) externalist epistemology, so that the lack of explicitly available justification does 
not imply a lack of justification.  Rescher’s invocation of C. S. Pierce’s account in which we 
automatically discount some hypotheses due to mental processes tied to our origins might be an 
example, as is Magnus’s invocation of Thomas Reid.  A constraint on an account of these 
inductive inferences is that it not be self-refuting.   
 
 Even if there is no global problem, there might still be important local problems of 
underdetermination.  Fundamental physics had flourishing cases of underdetermination into the 
early 1970s.5 6 These cases involve, for example, a rivalry between a theory with massless 
photons (the quantization of Maxwell’s theory) and a one-parameter family of theories with 
massive photons (attributed to Proca), the parameter being the photon mass.  Physicists, who 
individuate theories less finely, would see this as a rivalry between massless photons and 
massive photons, with the further question of ascertaining (or bounding) the photon mass.  The 
rivalry, which is immune to trivialization by Norton’s identical rivals strategy, is also permanent, 
because no experiment can show that the photon mass is zero rather than just suitably small.  The 
massive theories are not gauge theories, so there is much at stake conceptually in the rivalry.  
Electro-weak unification seems to favor the massless theory, however.   
                                                
2 John D. Norton, “Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory?” in Martin Carrier, Don Howard and 
Janet Kourany, editors, The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and 
Values Revisited, pp. 17-44, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh (2008).  
3 P. D. Magnus, Underdetermination and the Claims of Science, dissertation, University of 
California at San Diego (2002), 
http://dspace.sunyconnect.suny.edu/bitstream/1951/42590/1/dissertation-lulu.pdf 
4 John D. Norton, “The Inductive Significance of Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes,” 
PhilSci.   
5 J. Brian Pitts, “Permanent Underdetermination from Approximate Empirical Equivalence in 
Field Theory: Massless and Massive Electromagnetic, Yang-Mills and Gravitational Theories,” 
under review.   
6 David G. Boulware and Stanley Deser, “Can Gravitation Have a Finite Range?”  Physical 
Review D 6 (1972), p. 3368. 
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 Other sciences might have different sorts of handicaps.  Whereas Stanford argues from 
the fossils case that historical sciences might have a special advantage, Derek Turner7 has argued 
that they have special liabilities.  These claims, if not hastily generalized, need not conflict.  In 
any case the importance of distinguishing historical sciences from experimental sciences is clear.  
It was suggested that politically relevant sciences, such as climatology, might also pose special 
challenges.  Perhaps the urge to immediately apply the science is the cause.  Controversy seems 
not to arise in most engineering sciences in the way that it does for fundamental physics and 
various ideologically significant sciences.  If we should not accept a global underdetermination 
thesis, neither should we rush into a global determination thesis based on the safest cases.     
 
 Matters of politics and historical science both arise in the issue of creationism, which 
came up repeatedly in Norton’s papers and in informal discussion.  It is routine to dismiss as 
radical skepticism any proposal that conflicts with induction, as Stanford does.  However, it was 
long routine to accept that some part of Noah’s Flood was physically impossible, but happened 
anyway, because the Bible is true, so God must have performed a miracle;8 this view was 
challenged only when progressive Protestants such as Thomas Burnet in the late 17th century 
strove harder to make sense of the Flood without miracles.9 10  (They failed.)  The Bible is full of 
cases where it is deemed appropriate to make local exceptions to induction in favor of trusting 
divine revelation.  Non-Whiggish history of science therefore requires noting that what counts as 
a merely skeptical rival can be historically mutable.  While Norton’s response to the supposed 
novelty of Goodman’s new riddle of induction might well suffice,11 Hume’s old problem of 
induction is untouched.  Norton takes Bayesian accounts of confirmation to be the least friendly 
to underdetermination.12  But prior probabilities are infamously subjective.  In polemical contexts 
involving creationism, there might be little or nothing scientific to draw upon (if empirical 
agreement with mainstream science is built in) other than different priors (widely shared but of 
unclear origin) to favor ordinary geology over a Gosse-style young Earth created with fossils 
around 4004 B.C. or a scenario (perhaps never proposed) with miraculous fossil-sorting in the 
Flood.  Bayesian confirmation theory is then reduced to an ornate receptacle for the intuitions 
that such creationist strategies are implausible; thus Norton has difficulty in arguing for 
induction in the form of requiring space-times to be maximally extended---that is, that the history 
be as long as possible.13  (The problem of irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” is also relevant 
here:  the relevant hypothesis is the empirical adequacy of standard geology, the irrelevant one 
                                                
7 Derek D. Turner, Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007). 
8 Walter Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature (1652).   
9 Don Cameron Allen, The Legend of Noah:  Renaissance Rationalism in Art, Science and 
Letters, University of Illinois, Urbana (1963).  
10 John Keill, An Examination of Dr. Burnet’s Theory of the Earth: together with some remarks 
on Mr. Whiston’s New Theory of the Earth (1698).   
11 John D. Norton, “How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What Is New in the 
New Riddle of Induction,” Synthese 150 (2006), p. 185. 
12 John D. Norton, “Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory?”  
13 John D. Norton, “The Inductive Significance of Observationally Indistinguishable 
Spacetimes.”   
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the world’s actually being only c. 6000 years old.  The irrelevant hypothesis does not get 
confirmed by the fossil record even if the conjunction does, at the expense of the claim that the 
world is and looks young.)  Gerhard Schurz’s project of providing a non-question-begging 
defense of exceptionless induction against “esoteric worldviews”14 to address creationism is 
therefore noteworthy.  His argument, however, requires the premise that exceptionless induction 
has outperformed all esoteric worldviews in the past.  
 
 Manchak argues using global methods in General Relativity that data can never exclude 
exotic global space-time properties.  He also argues that attempts to exclude them by fiat run into 
difficulties, so we should seriously entertain exotic global space-time properties.  I suggest that, 
even granting Einstein’s equations, it is difficult to know what global space-time properties are 
physically possible.  Particle physicists in the 1930s-70s managed to derive Einstein’s equations 
as a classical field theory in Minkowski space-time basically just by rejecting negative energy 
instabilities;15 the result is that gravity is a Poincaré-type universal force.  That fact suggests that 
particle physicists also have a claim on what is possible globally given Einstein’s equations, 
though that question has not been pursued in much detail.  Such derivations in effect extend and 
complete Einstein’s Entwurf strategy, with essential use of energy-momentum conservation, 
though as a lemma rather than a postulate.16 17 Recent work on Einstein’s notebooks has led some 
historians to conclude that Einstein actually found his field equations substantially using the 
physical leg of his double strategy, not the mathematical leg which he credited with success.18  
Rather than try to settle who owns Einstein’s equations and gets to decide what further 
conditions can be imposed, I suggest splitting the difference.  Manchak’s exotic global features 
likely are possible given the mathematical standpoint, but might well be impossible given the 
particle physics approach.  Tame solutions of Einstein’s equations, those that would fit with any 
particle physicists’ sensibilities as well as the geometrical standpoint and hence definitely are 
possible according to our best theory, we might regard as a priori somewhat more probable than 
the more exotic solutions possible only given the geometrical view.  While the facts perhaps still 
could not force just one space-time upon us, we might have a rationally preferred candidate.   
 
                                                
14 Gerhard Schurz, “The Meta-inductivist’s Winning Strategy in the Prediction Games:  A New 
Approach to Hume’s Problem,” Philosophy of Science 75 (2008), p. 278. 
15 Peter van Nieuwenhuizen, “On Ghost-free Tensor Lagrangians and Linearized Gravitation,” 
Nuclear Physics B 60 (1973), p. 478. 
16 Albert Einstein and Marcel Grossmann, “Outline of a Generalized Theory of Relativity and of 
a Theory of Gravitation,” translated by Anna Beck with Don Howard, The Collected Papers of 
Albert Einstein, Volume 4, The Swiss Years: Writings, 1912-1914, English Translation, The 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Princeton University, Princeton (1996); translated from 
Entwurf einer verallgemeinerten Relativitätstheorie und einer Theorie der Gravitation, Teubner, 
Leipzig (1913).   
17 J. Brian Pitts and William C. Schieve, “Slightly Bimetric Gravitation,” General Relativity and 
Gravitation 33 (2001), p. 1319, gr-qc/0101058v3. 
18 Michel Janssen and Jürgen Renn, “Untying the Knot: How Einstein Found His Way Back to 
Field Equations Discarded in the Zurich Notebook,” in Jürgen Renn, editor, The Genesis of 
General Relativity, Volume 2: Einstein's Zurich Notebook: Commentary and Essays, pp. 839--
925, Springer, Dordrecht (2007), 
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 Magnus and Frost-Arnold suggest that surplus structure can sometimes be heuristically 
useful, so this can be a reason not to apply the identical rivals strategy.  I applaud their nuanced 
case-by-case approach.  Treating gravity as a universal force could be useful in quantization, for 
example, by providing resources for causality to be well-defined, whereas traditionally it is not 
very clear why canonical quantum gravity can introduce equal-time commutation relations in the 
absence of a prior notion of equal times.  There are also costs to the universal force view, such as 
the fact that the background metric, surprisingly, does not totally individuate points, on pain of 
indeterminism via the hole argument.  These issues are rich with open questions.   
 
 To conclude, even if there is no global underdetermination problem in science, there 
might be interesting local problems.  Such issues can inspire fruitful and important lines of 
research, whether in methodology, history, or science itself.   
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Posted March 29, 2009 
Ubiquity of Possible Massless vs. Massive Cases and the Value of Pursuit 
J. Brian Pitts 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Notre Dame 
 
 I thank John Norton for his response to some of my comments on induction and on 
underdetermination in electromagnetism.  He and I have some common ground regarding 
matters of induction.  I am more worried than he is by the idea of the non-existence of a one true 
logic of induction, however, perhaps because I am less sure that we have non-question-begging 
access to the facts in particular cases and so desire the one true logic to help to avoid arbitrary 
conclusions.   
 
 While I don’t see John as defending a determination thesis, I think that he underestimates 
the likelihood of significant cases of underdetermination in some contexts in contemporary 
physics as well as the value of taking them seriously as a strategy for perhaps resolving them.  It 
is helpful that John has outlined some of the features of massive Proca electromagnetism that I 
did not mention.  There are several differences between John's and my views of the significance 
of the Proca electromagnetic case, however.  In particular, in my comments I did not (partly for 
brevity) make clear some points that seem important, so I will try to do so now.       
 
 First of all, the electromagnetic case is representative of a phenomenon that one should, 
defeasibly, expect to be a generic possibility in particle physics.  For any field/particle that isn't 
obviously massive (by virtue of having a short range or requiring high energies to produce in 
accelerators), the question prima facie arises whether the field/particle is massless or massive.  
Those are the two great ways that fields/particles can be in relativistic field theory, 
corresponding to lacking or having in the Lagrangian density a term quadratic in the potential, 
respectively.  As far as I can tell, particle physicists don’t view one as a priori much more likely 
than the other, though experience with certain kinds of fields generates expectations that aren’t 
so a priori.  The defeasibility condition reminds us that technical details can and often do make a 
difference.  John writes as if the Proca electromagnetic case were the only situation where one 
had to entertain the question of massless vs. massive underdetermination.  But this sort of 
question routinely arises.  A proto-instance is Newtonian gravity, where Neumann and Seeliger 
entertained, in effect, massive scalar gravity in the non-relativistic limit in the 1890s.  Somehow 
a relativistic massive scalar gravity was not invented until 1968,19 to my knowledge, though 
adding such a term to Nordström’s theory would have been easy in the 1910s.  (I have found 
infinitely many such theories.)  If the bending of light had not been observed so soon, then there 
should have been a massless vs. massive underdetermination issue for scalar gravity.  Massive 
scalar gravity should have taught us much about space-time theory long ago, as I hope to explain 
elsewhere.  The massless vs. massive worry also should have been entertained for neutrinos.  In 
fact most people assumed neutrinos to be massless, but some entertained the massive possibility, 
and they were proven right eventually.  By taking the underdetermination issue seriously, we 
strengthen our ability to perform eliminative induction, entertaining what might otherwise be 
                                                
19 Peter G. O. Freund and Yoichiro Nambu, “Scalar Fields Coupled to the Trace of the Energy-
Momentum Tensor,” Physical Review 174 (1968), p. 1741. 
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unconceived or practically ignored alternatives.  Either we avoid unjustified optimism by 
suspending judgment or we are able to eliminate some possibilities and earn greater certainty.         
 
 One had to entertain massless vs. massive underdetermination for Yang-Mills theories, if 
the world had any examples of Yang-Mills theories, and the question was debated in the 1960s 
and early ’70s.  Empirically it was evident that an effective mass term (or some other way of 
avoiding long-range effects) existed for the weak and strong nuclear forces.  Spontaneous 
symmetry breaking turned out to offer an effective mass without an ordinary mass term for a 
Yang-Mills theory of the weak force, while an ordinary mass term turned out to behave badly.  
(Non-perturbative effects are important for the strong force.)  One had to entertain massless vs. 
massive underdetermination for gravity, at least if one wanted to avoid suffering from 
unconceived alternatives, and particle physicists did so from the 1940s to the early 1970s.  If 
supergravity (invented in the mid-1970s) had existed before massive gravity was generally set 
aside in 1970-72, then massless vs. massive underdetermination for (the spin 2 part of) 
supergravity would also have arisen.  For massive Yang-Mills and massive gravity, technical 
problems arise in quantum field theory, if not sooner, when a mass term is present.  That every 
stone has been turned in trying to address those problems seems unlikely, however.  If more 
particle physicists took it as their task to probe cases of apparent underdetermination thoroughly, 
or if philosophers of science often were also particle physicists, then the questions would get the 
attention that they deserve.  Partly due to the apparent accelerated expansion of the universe, 
physicists are increasingly willing to work on massive gravity once more, so there might be 
progress on this front.   
 
 Second, it isn’t clear to me what John means in regarding current bounds on the photon 
mass as implying that it is at most “very slight.”  I also do not understand what would be a 
“miniscule” photon mass, especially such that the massive case might “just [seem] much less 
credible than the zero mass of the standard theory.”  Perhaps “just seems” is intended literally, in 
which case the subjectivity is worrisome.  No doubt the current bounds on the photon mass are 
very small compared to the mass of a planet, or a horse, or a pea, or even an electron.  But mass 
is a dimensionful entity, so a value20 of 10-49 grams is not small or almost zero in any obvious 
objective sense, in the way that the number 10-49 is small (whether or not it is almost zero).  If 
one could produce a particle physics argument that a photon mass in this range is unlikely, or 
produce a probability distribution for photon masses that escapes Bertrand paradoxes in choosing 
between mass and squared mass for the distribution or displays invariance while achieving 
normalizability, etc.,21 22 then I could understand John’s concern and share it.  As matters stand, 
it’s difficult to know whether we have already shown the probability of a nonzero photon mass to 
be small, or we are just barely started in excluding massive candidates, or somewhere in 
between.  Further experimentation would either vindicate a Proca theory of some nonzero photon 
mass or refute the heaviest photon theories, allowing one to update the probability distribution by 
Bayesian conditionalization and hence raising the probability of a vanishing photon mass, 
                                                
20 L. C. Tu, J. Luo and G. T. Gillies, “The Mass of the Photon,” Reports on Progress in Physics 
68 (2005) p. 77. 
21 John D. Norton, “Ignorance and Indifference,” Philosophy of Science 75 (2008), p. 45.  
22 Rodney Holder, God, the Multiverse, and Everything:  Modern Cosmology and the Argument 
from Design. Ashgate, Burlington, Vermont (2004).   
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basically as John indicates.  But it is not at all clear how far along in this process we are already.  
There might also be relevant cosmological constraints and perhaps the energy-time uncertainty 
relation to consider as bounds to what could possibly be achieved inductively; it has been 
suggested that there is a limit around 10-66 grams below which we cannot clearly measure the 
photon mass.23  But is that almost zero?  Much of the interest of a photon mass, such as the 
annihilation of gauge freedom, the presence of three polarizations rather than two, etc., persists 
for any nonzero value, no matter how small.    
 
 Third, John seems to have it both ways regarding philosophers’ fine-grained theory 
individuation vs. physicists’ coarse-grained individuation.  Physicists don’t naturally think of 
different photon masses as picking out different theories; they think of massive electromagnetism 
as one theory as having an adjustable knob for the photon mass.  This difference is relevant given 
the rhetorical tendency of John’s phrasing such as “pulling another version of the theory from the 
hat,” which (while formally matching physicists’ usage in “version of the theory”) suggests, with 
the magician’s hat imagery, that by some tawdry philosopher’s trick something novel is 
gratuitously sneaked in to replace something old that has been slain by heroic facts.  On the 
contrary, one of the virtues of the Proca case is that it is natural (arising in real science), rather 
than cultured or artificial (in terms of Norton’s classification24) and hence not contrived.  A 
number of physicists have thought it questionable to set at zero a parameter than might well 
merely be small.25 26  Especially when conceptual issues are at stake, such as gauge freedom, 
such vigilance is appropriate.  While Norton’s point here seems to rely on philosopher’s sharp 
individuation of theories of massive photons to marginalize lower-mass varieties by emphasizing 
their distinction from higher-mass ones, his reading of the relevance of electroweak unification 
seems to require a rather coarse individuation of theories with massless photons.  Electroweak 
unification does not merely add new claims or new fields to electromagnetic theory.  It produces 
a new theory inconsistent with the old one; the physical photon field is not even the field 
entering the original Lagrangian in the electromagnetic way.27  Thus ordinary electromagnetism 
(Maxwell’s or standard quantum electrodynamics), not just the massive theories, was abandoned 
with electroweak unification, though the successor resembles the massless theories more closely 
than the massive theories, to be sure.   
 
 Fourth, John and I differ in where we see signal and where we see noise.  As noted 
above, I see signal in the generic prima facie possibility of a mass term for fields/particles that 
aren’t obviously heavy.  John seems not to have the generic situation in mind.  I see signal in the 
case of massless vs. massive scalar gravity, though the fact that gravity bends light implies that 
scalar gravity (massless or massive) is false.  I see signal in the case of neutrinos, where the mass 
term was vindicated after being quite widely ignored.  John sees signal in the fact that 
                                                
23 L. C. Tu, J. Luo and G. T. Gillies, “The Mass of the Photon.”   
24 John D. Norton, “Must Evidence Underdetermine Theory?” 
25 L. Bass and E. Schrödinger, “Must the Photon Mass be Zero?”  Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of London A 232 (1955), p. 1. 
26 Peter G. O. Freund, Amar Maheshwari and Edmond Schonberg, “Finite-Range Gravitation,” 
Astrophysical Journal 157 (1969), p. 857. 
27 Michio Kaku, Quantum Field Theory: A Modern Introduction. Oxford University, New York 
(1993), p. 337. 
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electroweak unification was taken as a good reason to prefer massless over massive 
electromagnetic theories.  To me that looks perhaps like noise, a piece of good luck for the 
opponent of underdetermination, something that one could not have regarded as likely in advance 
on methodological grounds (though the idea of the instability of empirical equivalence under 
change of auxiliaries might call attention to the bare possibility).  The technical issues regarding 
massive Yang-Mills and massive gravity theories look to me like more good luck for the 
opponent of underdetermination (in addition to the possibility that further exploration could 
perhaps alter the outcomes).  No insights into underdetermination in general could make such 
problems likely; only insights into technical matters of particle physics could reveal the 
problems.  One cannot rationally expect to be lucky.  One can, perhaps, expect such “luck” if one 
believes Hegel’s Absolute Spirit to be watching over scientific history by making things easy to 
ensure progress toward the truth.  Otherwise we have to consider the significance of a generic 
possibility that is sometimes vindicated, and sometimes at least provisionally overcome by a 
string of accidents on some important occasions.  Not being a Hegelian, I am more confident in 
the methodological significance of the generic possibility which sometimes comes true than in 
that of lucky apparent exceptions.   
 
 While I am not sure that there is ultimately underdetermination in cases of this sort in 
particle physics, it looks like a live possibility.  Moreover, one does better science by seriously 
entertaining underdetermination and trying to shut the door to some options through research 
than by assuming, as Pollyanna and Pangloss might be tempted, that there is no problem and 
resting comfortably with what seems most probable at the moment.  In the case of gravity, the 
warrant for General Relativity is much greater due to particle physicists’ showing that nothing 
else is possible (to oversimplify a bit),28 rather than resting comfortably in the irreversible 
progress already made by Einstein in the 1910s.29  The task of applying confirmation theory to 
cases of apparent underdetermination also suggests interesting methodological questions.   
 
                                                
28 David G. Boulware and Stanley Deser, “Classical General Relativity Derived from Quantum 
Gravity,” Annals of Physics 89 (1975), p. 193.   
29 Jürgen Ehlers, “The Nature and Structure of Spacetime,” in The Physicist's Conception of 
Nature, editor Jagdish Mehra. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, (1973), p. 71. 
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Reply to John Manchak on Particle Physics and Global Space-time Properties 
 
 John Manchak’s response to my proposal suggests that some discussion of just what the 
particle physics approach to cosmology is, or ought to be, might be of use.  He takes a geometric 
approach to Einstein’s equations for granted.  I suspect that he reasons something like this:   
1.  Einstein’s theory involves his equations as a key aspect of local differential 
  geometry. 
2. Local differential geometry leaves a great deal unspecified about global differential 
 geometry. 
3. Einstein’s theory fixes nothing more than local differential geometry. 
4.  Therefore Einstein’s theory leaves a great deal unspecified about global 
  differential geometry.   
Manchak’s results provide a vivid reminder of the lack of specification of global geometry by 
local geometry.  They also indicate that making global geometry more specific by adding the 
sorts of postulates that seem natural in global General Relativity tends either to admit solutions 
that one might not have wanted or to exclude solutions that one might have wanted.     
 
 A core assumption of particle physicists’ approach to gravity (often largely implicit, 
perhaps in calculations) is that gravity is just another force like the electromagnetic and other 
fields; gravity differs from the other forces in (generally more difficult) technical details, but not 
conceptually, except insofar as the technical details require.30 31 32 33 34  The other forces are 
assumed by default to live in Minkowski space-time, so it is natural to assume (defeasibly) that 
gravity, a self-interacting spin 2 field, lives there also.  Thus the analog of premise 3 above fails.  
Another common feature of particle physicists’ treatments of gravitation is a rather pragmatic 
disregard for conceptual issues, so we should not be surprised if important conceptual issues 
have lain dormant for considerable lengths of time.  In what follows I aim to explore particle 
physicists’ idea that gravity is just another force, while attending to conceptual issues and aiming 
for logical consistency.35  That aim is helped by an old paper by Roger Penrose,36 who strove to 
                                                
30 Suraj N. Gupta, “Gravitation and Electromagnetism,” Physical Review 96 (1954), p. 1683. 
31 Peter van Nieuwenhuizen, “An Introduction to Covariant Quantization of Gravitation,” in 
Remo Ruffini, editor, Proceedings of the First Marcel Grossmann Meeting on General 
Relativity, 1975, Trieste.  North Holland, Amsterdam, 1977. 
32 Carlo Rovelli, “Notes for a Brief History of Quantum Gravity,” Proceedings of the Ninth 
Marcel Grossmann Meeting (held at the University of Rome “La Sapienza”', 2-8 July 2000), in 
Robert T. Jantzen,   Remo Ruffini and V. G. Gurzadyan, editors.  World Scientific, River Edge, 
New Jersey (2002), gr-qc/0006061.  Rovelli portrays particle physicists’ views without 
endorsing them. 
33 Richard P. Feynman et al., Feynman Lectures on Gravitation.  Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
Mass. (1995); original by California Institute of Technology (1963). 
34 Steven Weinberg, Gravitation and Cosmology.  Wiley, New York (1972).  
35 J. Brian Pitts and William C. Schieve, “Null Cones and Einstein's Equations in Minkowski 
Spacetime,” Foundations of Physics 34 (2004), p. 211, gr-qc/0406102.  
36 Roger Penrose, “On Schwarzschild Causality  -- A Problem for ‘Lorentz Covariant’ General 
Relativity,” in F. J. Tipler, editor, Essays in General Relativity---A Festschrift for Abraham 
Taub.  Academic, New York (1980). 
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show what he took Steven Weinberg to be committed to accepting based on his remarks on the 
particle physics approach to Einstein’s equations.  While particle physicists often employ 
perturbative methods, they are not essential.  The particle physics approach, by taking gravity to 
be just another field, takes the gravitational field to be no more relevant a priori to space-time 
geometry than electromagnetism or the weak nuclear force, for example.  These forces are not 
permitted to violate the flat metric’s causal structure or alter the topology of space-time.  
Vigilance is required to keep interacting spin 3/2 fields from violating the flat metric’s causal 
structure.37  Given that conceptual novelties are introduced only when required on technical 
grounds, an argument is needed for permitting a self-interacting spin 2 field (gravity) to violate 
the background null cone structure or affect space-time topology.  One way to make such an 
argument would be to show that solutions needed on physical grounds must burst out of the 
restrictions imposed by the flat metric.  Such arguments have rarely been attempted, however.       
 
Penrose takes up this challenge by attempting to show that the particle physicists’ view 
cannot be pushed to logical completion.  In particular, Penrose argues that are two importantly 
different ways to relate the effective curved space-time metric of the Schwarzschild solution to a 
flat background metric.  One way of relating the two metrics has the effective curved metric’s 
null cone leaking out past the flat background metric’s null cone, implying violating of causality 
in the sense of Special Relativity---which is relevant given the particle physicist’s view that 
gravity is just another force living in Minkowski space-time with merely technical 
complications.  That result would be problematic for particle physicists inclined to scientific 
realism and intent on treating gravity as just another force.  (As noted above, many are rather 
pragmatic.)  The other way of relating the two metrics has the effective curved metric’s null cone 
everywhere inside the flat background metric’s null cone (thus respecting special relativistic 
causality), but the integrated deviation between the two null cones diverges at infinity.  Such 
divergence makes trouble for scattering theory, in which Weinberg was involved.  (One perhaps 
could have both causality violation and difficulties in scattering if one were careless.)  Thus the 
flat background metric either doesn’t play its usual role as a bound on propagation of fields, or is 
inconvenient for Weinberg’s scattering purposes.  If someone thinks that the flat background 
metric is real and thinks that it make scattering convenient, then Penrose’s argument poses a 
problem.  If one believes only one of those claims, however, then Penrose’s argument poses no 
serious problem.  It is hardly news that long-range potentials have inconvenient scattering 
properties.38 39  Thus there appears to be no known serious objection to the possibility of treating 
gravitation consistently as a spin 2 field theory in Minkowski space-time at present.   
 
Thus far I have addressed the question of what particle physicists ought to say about 
cosmology.  Why should one entertain it as perhaps true?  The particle physics approach to 
gravity has the unifying virtue of treating gravity and other forces in the same fashion.  It might 
be useful in excluding the bizarre on principled grounds also.   
                                                
37 Giorgio Velo and Daniel Zwanziger, “Propagation and Quantization of Rarita-Schwinger 
Waves in an External Electromagnetic Field,” Physical Review 186 (1969) p. 1337.   
38 Herbert Goldstein, Classical Mechanics, second edition.  Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
(1980).  
39 J. Brian Pitts and William C. Schieve, “Slightly Bimetric Gravitation,” General Relativity and 
Gravitation 33 (2001), p. 1319, gr-qc/0101058v3. 
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Posted March 27, 2009 
Underdetermination In Science 
 
John D. Norton 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science 
Center for Philosophy of Science 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
1. The Underlying Picture. 
 
I'd like to repeat an invitation made during the closing discussion. The project is to catalog the 
various attitudes that underlie positions in the debate over underdetermination in science. May I 
invite comment, additions and corrections to the list below? 
 
My impression is that the debate is rooted ultimately in very different conceptions or perhaps just 
different perspective on science. My goal at this point is not the familiar one of deciding an issue 
by argument and debate. Indeed my sense is that argument and debate has done little more than 
force concessions on opposing sides so they start to agree on superficial matters but remain 
separated in their deeper outlooks. A fuller understanding of the debate, I believe, requires a kind 
of anthropological analysis that will bring these deeper views to light. 
 
Here are five conceptions: 
 
(a) ("Pollyanna/Pangloss") The world presents science with a difficult puzzle. Through creativity 
and ingenuity, scientists are able mostly to solve the puzzle and find the truths that lie behind 
appearances. 
 
This optimistic view--hence "Pollyanna" and "Pangloss"--leads one to discount 
underdetermination as a minor threat to science. It is my view.40 
 
Other views favor underdetermination: 
 
(b) ("Einstein") Scientific theories are not merely passive reflections of the world, but, in 
significant measure, a product of human creativity. Underdetermination arises because of the 
                                                
40 I fully acknowledge that there are numerous cases in which the evidence we have fails to 
determine a particular theory. That circumstance is generic in newly developing sciences. My 
optimism is that these cases of underdetermination are not irresolvable. I am routinely astonished 
at just how much we can figure out. Two hundred years ago, who could have imagined that we 
could ever know the chemical composition of the sun, let alone discover a new element there? 
This optimism is just my opinion. Just as there are no good, principled arguments supporting a 
thesis of universal underdetermination, our understanding of inductive inference is too 
rudimentary to provide general and principled arguments for my optimism. 
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essentially creative character of scientific theorizing. It opens a space in which human creativity 
can be exercised to a fuller extent in the generation of many theories. 
 
This view is more optimistic about scientists than scientific discovery. Its label comes from 
Einstein's remarks about scientific theories as the "free creations of the human spirit." 
 
(c) ("Cartesian Demon") The world is hostile to us and out to trick us. It has done so successfully 
in the past. We have thought repeatedly that we have found the final truth only to discover that 
we were misled. We should resist and not let the world trick us again into thinking that this time 
we have discerned the truth behind the appearances. It is a useful philosophical project to 
understand better how we come to be misled. 
 
This pessimistic view is a modern version of the skeptical pessimism famously sketched by the 
possibility of Descartes' deceiving demons. 
 
(d) ("hubris")41 Our inductive methods have been developed and tested in ordinary experiences. 
We overestimate their power when it comes to extrapolating them beyond the mundane 
challenges of ordinary life to profound challenges of the innermost secrets of space, time, matter, 
life and the mind.  
 
See Kyle's statement for a fuller development. My reading of Brian’s remarks on theories of 
massive photons and massive gravity suggest some sympathy with this approach. More 
precisely, his concern is that physicists overestimate the determining power of evidence and 
thereby fail to explore promising alternative theories. 
 
Finally there is a view whose origins do not lie in considerations of evidence directly: 
 
(e) (“relativist”)42 Science is a component of human culture and cannot be separated from its 
cultural context. One component of that context is the portrayal of scientists as heroic explorers 
using reason to discover the truths of nature. If we are to understand science, we should no more 
believe this portrayal that an anthropologist should believe the doctrines of some arcane cult that 
is subject to anthropological study. 
 
This view, popular among some sociologists and historians of science, agrees that science does 
provide a narrative in which evidence is seen sometimes to provide strong support for certain of 
its hypotheses. That fact is taken to have no more significance than the fact that arcane cults have 
narratives in which the absolute truths of their doctrines are assured by the interpretation of 
sacred texts and other signs. Sometimes there can be internal indications that these narratives are 
flawed. In the case of science, the underdetermination thesis is such an internal indication. 
 
I do not include other, more opportunistic motivations for underdetermination that do not reflect 
a deeper world picture that inclines for or against underdetermination. One might favor 
                                                
41 Added April 16, 2009. This addition was suggested by Kyle Stanford’s remarks. 
42 Added April 10, 2009. My thanks to Dana Tulodziecki for suggesting an addition along these 
lines. 
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underdetermination simply because one has some results in science that happen to fit with the 
doctrine of underdetermination, while not otherwise having a deeper sympathy with the view. Or 
one might find it expedient to endorse underdetermination as a way of advancing a minority 
theory in science. This latter tactic is limited. It does enable one to say that the majority view 
cannot have been selected solely on the basis of evidence. However that same limit applies to the 
minority theory; it is also underdetermined. 
 
2. Unconceived Alternatives 
 
My article on the underdetermination thesis (Norton, 2008) surveys how the thesis fares in 
relation to many different accounts of induction. I did not comment then on Kyle's fertile notion 
of "unconceived alternatives." 
 
My sense is that Kyle's concept relates to most theories of inductive inference in the following 
way. Whenever one makes an inductive inference, one takes an inductive risk in one form or 
another. One generally does not reflect too much on just how the gamble may be lost. Talk of 
"unconceived alternatives" is a way of making the possibility of failure concrete. It relates most 
naturally to all eliminative forms of inductive inference. The one Kyle points to most often is 
abduction or inference to the best explanation. We can fail to identify the best explanation simply 
because we never thought of it. 
 
The problem arises in all forms of inductive inference. Whenever we lose an inductive gamble, it 
is because something did not go as we expected. Those who had only ever seen white swans did 
not expect the black swans of Western Australia. Sometimes we may have consciously thought 
of how the gamble may be lost. That would be a conceived alternative. Sometime we may have 
not. 
 
The mere fact of the pervasiveness of unconceived alternatives should not make us into inductive 
skeptics. What is of decisive importance is how likely these alternatives are. A credible 
underdetermination threat requires that the unconceived alternatives also be credible. There 
clearly are cases in which they are. Modern theories of quantum gravity provide a signal 
example. We can be pretty sure that we have scarcely begun to explore the alternatives. It will go 
differently in other cases. No doubt there are still as yet unconceived alternatives to the roughly 
elliptical orbits of our planets and to the periodic table of the elements. But I doubt they are 
credible. 
 
For this reason, I see Kyle's case of fossils in the 16th and 20th century differently. He portrays it 
as a gradual shift in the inductive inference form used from one prone to the problem (abduction) 
to one that is not (projection). In my view, both are prone to the problem. However, in the 
particular cases Kyle describes, the abductions happened to be more troubled by them than did 
the projections, which are essentially immune to them. 
 
Finally I should mention that I don't see the same sort of principled difference between abduction 
and projection that Kyle does. In accord with my material views on induction, the idea of 
"abduction" itself is merely a rough and ready gloss on a scattered collection of inductive 
inferences that we like to group together under the one label. The same is true of "projection." So 
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the progression of inductive inferences on fossils from the 16th to the 20th century is, in my 
view, a progression from weaker to stronger inductive inferences with correspondingly less 
inductive risk. 
 
For more on abduction and other issues, see (Norton, manuscript a). 
 
3. Ptolemy and Copernicus Again 
 
Greg Frost-Arnold's remarks on the Ptolemy-Copernicus example in my talk give me the 
opportunity to correct a misimpression. I had not intended to make a point about 
underdetermination in real astronomy circa 1543. Rather I intended only to cook up a highly 
contrived "toy" example to illustrate vividly the notion of equivalence of theories, sometimes 
called notational variation. I imagined an oversimplified Ptolemy-like theory for Mars that 
employed only an epicycle and a deferent; and I imagined a Copernicus-like theory for Mars that 
employed perfect circular motion for the Earth and Mars. In so far as we restrict our attention 
only to observational astronomy, the two theories come out as equivalent. The equivalence is 
easily seen in that we map the Ptolemaic theory onto the Copernican by shifting Mars' epicycle 
into the circle that is the Earth's orbit. 
 
Of course the moment we make things more realistic, or the moment we broaden our concern to 
include the dynamics that bring about the motions, then the intertranslatability no longer holds. 
 
In retrospect, the example was chosen poorly since it is too much to ask a historically and 
scientifically sophisticated audience to forget all the history and science they know! 
 
 
4. For Determination or Against Underdetermination? 
 
From his remarks, my sense is that Brian Pitts and I differ quite widely on our underlying 
pictures of science, so we tend to read into each other's writings things that were never intended. 
I apologize in advance to Brian if the remarks below misconstrue his views. 
 
My impression is that Brian sees me as advocating some thesis of evidential determination in 
science. While I am sympathetic to the idea that evidence has strong import, neither my papers 
nor my talk argue for a thesis of determination. Rather the point that I stress, especially in my 
talk, is that our understanding of inductive inference is so incomplete as to make such an 
argument unsustainable. 
 
It is exactly this same incompleteness that forms the basis of my complaints about the 
underdetermination thesis. That thesis asserts that evidence must always underdetermine theory. 
It is a very strong claim about what is possible in principle for inductive inference. It must be 
distinguished from the simple notion of underdetermination, which I do not find controversial. 
That is, along with virtually all philosophers of science, I have no doubt that there are many 
cases in which the evidence we have fails to determine a particular theory and that this evidential 
lacuna can persist. This seems to be the case at present with all theories of quantum gravity. 
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My major point about the underdetermination thesis is one already widely recognized: most 
arguments for the thesis depend upon accepting just one defective account of induction, a 
simple-minded hypothetico-deductivism. I note, in contrast to this, that other more developed 
accounts of inductive inference do not yield similar failures of determination. However, 
elsewhere (Norton, 2003), I have urged that none of these is the One True Logic of Induction. 
While the Bayesian system Brian mentions has had some notable successes, I do not believe it 
can claim to be that One True Logic. (See Norton, manuscript b, for detailed reasons, some of 
which endorse Brian's hesitations about the approach.) 
 
The upshot is that we just do not understand enough about induction to be able to sustain grand 
claims in either direction about the universality of determination or underdetermination. 
 
Brian discusses Proca's theory of massive photons. In it, light propagates at speeds less than the 
constant c of the Lorentz transformation, according to just how much mass photons have. It is 
hard to see what moral can be drawn from the example. At best one can say that, temporarily, 
there was a problem picking between the massive theory and the standard theory, as long as one 
assumed only a very slight mass for the photon. However that underdetermination did not persist. 
If I have understood Brian's remarks correctly, Proca's theory of massive photons was abandoned 
with the advent of the electroweak unification. So at best the moral seems to be one of transient 
underdetermination, terminating in a decision on the basis of new insights. This story gives 
comfort to those who favor determination. 
 
Even prior to this decision it is unclear what moral to draw. Proca's theory was not a theory but a 
family of theories, indexed by a parameter with an unknown value. This fact gave the theory 
temporary protection from experimental falsification. A demonstration that the photon mass 
cannot be such and such can always be countered by pulling another version of the theory from 
the hat with a smaller mass parameter. Nonetheless, the case seems one that inductive inference 
can decide. If the standard theory is correct, then, if anyone cares to do them, new experiments 
can continue to drive the mass parameter to lower and lower values until the possibility of some 
miniscule, as yet untested mass just seems much less credible than the zero mass of the standard 
theory. Or, if some version of Proca's theory is correct, that will eventually reveal itself. One 
might think that the possible smallness of the mass would be an obstacle. With sufficiently small 
mass, the speed of light might come out at 99.999%c, which is hard to discriminate from c. But it 
is a simple matter of Minkowski spacetime geometry that, if one observer finds a propagation at 
99.999%c, there will be another moving relatively, that might judge it to be 90%c, which is 
easily discriminable from 100%c. 
 
Finally, Brian mentions that the decision between Proca's and the standard theory is immune to 
my concern about the possibility of rival theories merely being notational variants of one another 
("identical rivals strategy"). Here I agree with him. My remarks about the possibility of 
notational variants apply to the very special case of two theories with identical observational 
consequences. These two rivals are not identical observationally. One asserts a speed of light less 
than c; the other asserts a speed of light equal to c. 
 
Addition posted March 29, 2009 
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Brian Pitts has now written a lengthy response (March 29) to these remarks. On pain of a 
combinatorial explosion, I will not react point by point. However this much summarizes my 
reaction. Brian pictures me as positively defending views that directly contradict his, whereas 
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Posted March 29, 2009 
John Manchak 
 
I very much appreciate Brian's comments with regard to my talk. However, it is not yet clear to 
me how particle physics is, in any way, connected with global spacetime structure. I do not doubt 
that certain assumptions within particle physics can be used to derive Einstein's equation (or 
possibly some other local field theory). But, it seems that more must be said to support the view 
that this local derivation "suggests that particle physicists also have a claim on what is possible 
globally." Why should the particle physicist's physical sensibilities (gained presumably from 
doing local physics) matter, at all, to the cosmologist? 
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Posted April 10, 2009 
Dana Tulodziecki 
 
I’d like to thank Greg for his two questions, and answer them (very briefly).  Greg’s first 
question is how my approach differs from/extends upon Laudan’s in Demystifying 
Underdetermination.  Laudan gives one (historical) example of a case in which it is possible to 
invoke a methodological rule capable of determining theory-choice (341).  However, he goes on 
to claim that “[w]e need not concern ourselves here with whether [the rule] is methodologically 
sound” (341), concluding just a little later that “[t]hat complex of rules and evidence determined 
the choice between the two systems of mechanics, for anyone who accepted the rule(s) in 
question” (second emphasis mine, 342). 
I (obviously) agree with Laudan that we ought to look at the rules, but I think the question is 
precisely whether the rules we look at are methodologically sound, and what rules, if any, we are 
justified in accepting on an epistemic basis.  But, in that case, the question arises of how we can 
establish the connection between these rules and a theory’s (approximate) truth/success.  In order 
to give substance to claims about the epistemic importance of methodological rules, we need to 
have some idea of what these rules are, and an argument to the effect that they are, in fact, 
epistemically significant.  I want to suggest that we can do both by engaging in historical case-
studies like that of Snow.   
Greg’s second question is how all this might help us with unconceived alternatives.  The first 
thing to say is that I’m not sure how much help is needed -- I think that we can judge the severity 
of underdetermination only on a case by case basis (something that also came out in many 
different parts of the workshop).  In this vein, I think that some unconceived alternatives will 
turn out to be legitimate threats to our current theories, and some will not.  What an appeal to 
methodological principles can do is help us determine which unconceived alternatives are 
particularly threatening (for example, those that make no use of any epistemically interesting 
rules aren’t). 
 
Lastly, I also have a series of questions for Kyle.  I now realise that I’m confused about what 
exactly Kyle’s view is, so these aren’t as well-formed as I’d like (but perhaps someone else can 
either make my worries more concrete or else explain why they’re not really worries).  Like 
John, I don’t think there is a fundamental difference between the projective and abductive 
scenarios.  But even if there were, what reason is there to think that theories/hypotheses typically 
fall primarily into one but not the other category?  Hypotheses might have many different kinds 
of evidence going for them, some projective, some abductive.  In addition, even the same 
evidence might play different roles in different parts of the theory, there might be several 
different routes (some projective, some abductive, perhaps) to the same evidence, and so on 
(although I’m not familiar enough with fossil theory to see how these points might apply in this 
particular case, and I can’t think of any good examples right now).  I take it Kyle’s view is that a 
theory is less vulnerable to PUA if it’s primarily projective; however, it seems that this would 
have the following consequence: in this case, the mere existence of additional (abductive) 
evidence would render a hypothesis more vulnerable to PUA than having less (only projective) 
evidence going for it.  This seems like an odd consequence to me. 
 
References: 
Laudan, L. (1990), ‘Demystifying Underdetermination’, reprinted in Curd & Cover (eds.), 
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Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, New York, Norton, 1998: 320–353. 
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P. D. Magnus 
 
A few weeks ago, I participated in a workshop on underdetermination at the Pittsburgh Center 
for Philosophy of Science. The conference was fabulous, both socially and intellectually. Here's a 
post growing out of that, specifically about John Manchak's work on global features of spacetime. 
 
The post is somewhat rambling, so let me begin by summing up: 
 
The underdetermination facing our theorizing about global features of spacetime is 
formally more like familiar illustrations of the problem of induction than it is like 
familiar examples of empirical equivalence. Yet (if Manchak is right) it is different 
than usual worries about induction because we could never have the right kind of 
background knowledge to justify the inductive generalization. 
 
John Manchak discussed his work on observationally indistinguishable spacetimes: There are some 
properties which, if they held in our universe, we could not know to hold. Manchak gave the 
example of 'hole-freeness', the property that a spacetime has got if there aren't any holes in it. I'll 
stick with that example. 
 
The proof (originally sketched in the 1970s by David Malament and recently proven by Manchak) 
models each spacetime point as a possible observer. Observers are then treated as knowing 
everything about the contents of their past light cones.* Now consider an (almost**) arbitrary 
hole-free spacetime ALPHA. We can cut up ALPHA and assemble a different spacetime BETA, 
such that there is a region of BETA corresponding to the past light cone of every observer in 
ALPHA plus an additional region that contains a hole. Observers who collected all of the 
observations afforded by ALPHA could not know whether they were in hole-free ALPHA or holey 
BETA. 
 
Manchak argues that this is a result particularly about global spacetime structure and that it does not 
hint at any general kind of underdetermination plaguing scientific inference. Physicists attempt to 
overcome the underdetermination by putting restrictions on what counts as a physically plausible 
spacetime, but such restrictrions (argues Manchak) are ad hoc and ultimately unsuccessful. We 
don't ordinarily reckon with things like the structure of the entire universe, so our ordinary 
intuitions can't be relied on to constrain the space of possibilities. 
 
All of that seems right to me, as far as it goes. Note that the underdetermination here is 
asymmetrical. If spacetime is not hole-free, then the hole must be in the causal past of some 
spacetime point and so an observer there could know about it. The underdetermination arises only if 
spacetime is hole-free, because all the hole-free observations can be embedded in a spacetime that 
includes holes elsewhere. 
 
Familiar cases of (allegedly) empirically equivalent theories are not like this, but instead are 
symmetrical. Take the claim that we live in a physical world. Consider the rival Cartesian claim that 
we are immaterial things deceived by an evil demon into thinking that there is a material world. 
Assuming that the choice between these is underdetermined, it is underdetermined regardless of 
which of the two possibilities actually obtains. 
 
Note, however, that common illustrations of the problem of induction do have an asymmetric 
structure like the spacetime case. Suppose we start with a world ALPHA in which all swans are 
white. We can construct a world BETA in which there are all the swans in ALPHA plus a black 
swan. If we only observe white swans, then it might or might not be the case that all swans are 
white. Yet if it's not the case that all swans are white, there is an observation that would show as 
much (an observation of one of the non-white swans).*** 
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Or consider instead a world ALPHA in which all humans are mortal. Provided every observer has 
an open future, we can construct a world BETA in which all of the observations in ALPHA occur at 
some place and time but there are immortal people. This seems strictly analogous to Manchak's 
case, because the requirement of an open future is just the requirement that ALPHA not be causally 
bizarre. 
 
If I am right about all of this, then there is a parallel between the inductive conclusions 'Spacetime is 
hole-free', 'All swans are white', and 'All men are mortal.' Yet I agree with Manchak that the first of 
these is importantly different. 
 
Let's start with what John Norton calls a material theory of induction: Induction requires 
background knowledge about the domain of objects about which we are generalizing. 
 
In the case of swans and whiteness, we know that natural species typically have variable colouration. 
So we conclude that swans are not the kind of thing that are likely to all be of the same colour. The 
observation of many white swans does not suffice to show that all swans are white, regardless of 
how many we observe. 
 
In the case of humans and mortality, we know that human bodies are fragile things. People are apt 
to get injured or sick eventually. Moreover, bodies grow decrepit with age. So we are justified in 
concluding that all humans are mortal. 
 
In the case of spactime and hole-freeness, as Manchak argues, we don't know anything which 
constrains the global structure of spacetime sufficiently to underwrite an induction. So we would 
never be in a position to conclude that spacetime is hole-free. 
 
 
* John Norton raised the worry that there might be holes in our causal past which we wouldn't be 
able to notice. That kind of underdetermination is not at issue here. The question is just whether 
infallible observers of their hole-free pasts would ever be able justified in concluding that all of 
spacetime is hole-free. 
** The proof excludes 'causally bizarre' spacetimes in which a single observer can survey all of an 
inextensible spacetime at once. This would require that some observers be able to see their own 
future; ie, time travel would be possible. Manchak retorts that if time travel were possible then 
indistinguishability would be the least of our problems. 
*** To make it exact, add the constraint that one could never have observed all of the swans in the 
world. This is formally parallel to the assumption that spacetime is not causally bizarre. (Alternately, 





Thinking more about indistinguishable spacetimes has led me to think about the contrast 
between underdetermination and indeterminacy. Somehow, I wrote a dissertation on the former 
without clearly thinking through the latter. 
 
In a discussion note (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004505/) that he wrote for the 
workshop but did not present, John Norton suggests that "the indistinguishability does not pertain 
to theory. We are not presented, for example, with general relativity and some competitor theory, 
indistinguishable from it. Rather, what we cannot distinguish is whether this spacetime is the one of 
our observations or whether it is that one" (p. 4). Yet this requires drawing a line between a theory 
and a detail filled out within a theory. 
26 
 
Suppose we accept a statement conception of theories. General relativity is a set of axioms and their 
consequences. Add some claim about spacetime (e.g. that it is hole-free), and it's one more axiom. 
The specification is still a theory and can be pitted against a rival specification. 
 
One might still say: A theory is more than just any old collection of sentences. A theory is a system 
of laws. General relativity is a theory because it's got the general laws, but specifications just add 
local detail. This may separate the sheep from the population ecology, but it won't cut the mustard 
here. The specifications of spacetimes are definitely not local detail. Spacetime being hole-free is a 
fact about the global topology of spacetime. It's plausibly even a law. (Whether or not it is 
ultimately a law depends on what we think "law" means.) 
 
Suppose we accept the semantic conception of theories instead. General relativity is a set of 
possible models. Models with hole-free spacetimes are a subset which can itself be treated as a 
theory. 
 
I'm a pluralist about theory concepts, so I can't insist that there is no possible understanding of 
theory such that general relativity is a theory and the specifications are not. I just don't see what it 
would be. 
 
So I don't think that Norton's attempt to make this not about theory succeeds. But I think he's right 
to think there's a difference between underdetermination between rival theories and indeterminacy 
within a theory. 
 
Underdetermination obtains when we can't responsibly decide between rival theories. If this 
inability only holds for a narrow range of circumstances, then there isn't anything of especially 
philosophical interest: We begin in ignorance, do some research, and discover something. 
Underdetermination of the sort that typical concerns philosophers holds for a broad range of 
circumstances, possible every circumstance we could ever hope to be in. (In my work, I call this 
range of circumstances the 'scope' of the underdetermination.) 
 
Indeterminacy obtains when a theory can be specified in different and significantly incompatible 
ways. For example, the number of particles in the universe is indeterminate in classical mechanics. 
If you specify the number of particles, then you can put the machinery of the theory to work - but 
the theory won't tell you how many particles you should consider. A different way of putting the 
point is that classical mechanics has models with any number of particles. 
 
To get a feel for how underdetermination and indeterminacy interact, consider some examples: 
 
A. The gravitational constant simply appears as a parameter in Newton's theory of gravity. The 
theory does not tell us what the constant must be. It's indeterminate. Yet, since there is no problem 
is supposing that there is a precise value for the constant in the world; we can try to formulate the 
specified theory that includes both the law of gravity and the correct value for the constant. We can 
determine the constant experimentally (within error bars) and so its value is not underdetermined. 
 
B. It is possible to describe arrangements in classical mechanics such that two outcomes are equally 
compatible with the theory; e.g. Norton's Dome. This is clearly indeterminacy. We could specify 
which of the outcomes will occur, effectively forging a more specific theory that is not indeterminate 
in this way. Yet there is no principled reason to specify one outcome rather than another. Since we 
can't construct a Norton Dome, there is no way to resolve the matter experimentally. Even 
supposing we were justified in accepting classical mechanics, we would not be justified in accepting 
a more specific theory which avoided the indeterminacy. So the choice between specific theories 
would be underdetermined. Yet the Dome indeterminacy would not have conjured a rival to classical 
mechanics. Our acceptance of the more general theory might withstand underdetermination, even if 
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it arises for the specifications. 
 
C. In Quantum Mechanics, as it's usually construed, particles typically don't have determinate 
positions and momenta. Yet we can't just freely imagine precise quantities out in the world. The 
Kochen-Specker Theorem puts constraints on there being precise values, precluding certain kinds 
of hidden variable theories. Presuming that QM were true, this limitation would not be an epistemic 
problem at all - there would be indeterminate quantities in the world. We could (in principle) know 
them as precisely as the world defines them, so it wouldn't be a matter of underdetermination. 
 
D. In General Relativity (to return to the Malament/Manchak proof) the theory is compatible with 
spacetime having different global features. So we have indeterminacy. If some of those features 
obtain, then neither observation nor theoretical considerations would justify our thinking that they 
obtained. (See my previous post for a brief explanation as to why.) So we'd face 
underdetermination. Yet this underdetermination does not show that our acceptance of GR is 
underdetermined. We cannot responsibly decide between GR&H and GR&not-H, say, but that 
does not show that GR itself has any serious rivals. 
 
Notice also that we might fret over questions of indeterminacy within theories that we think are 
simply false. We can no longer responsibly believe classical mechanics, for example, so we are not 
in scope of any interesting underdetermination for it against any rivals - but it can be 
philosophically rewarding to consider indeterminacies like the Norton Dome. I think that this is 
because indeterminacy is fundamentally a logical or metaphysical question, and so it may be 
rewardingly chased even into the den of otherworldly counterfactuals. Underdetermination is 
primarily an epistemic or epistemological question, and so it matters primarily insofar as it tells us 





Greg asks of my position how it differs in its predictions from those of the constructive 
empiricist. I think significantly. In the general case, consider a scientific theory that we identify 
as being better than the theory it replaced, which includes cases we’re inclined to describe as 
modifications to a theory rather the introduction of an entirely distinct theory. The perceived 
progress achieved will not be attributed solely to increased empirical content. Ad hoc 
modifications achieve this much, but are not considered progressive. Progress must therefore 
involve appeals to considerations such as simplicity, consilience, etc. The constructive empiricist 
acknowledges the role of such factors, but denies they are indicators of truth. However, the fact 
that some theoretical claim is endorsed on the basis of pragmatic considerations, relative to one 
data set, is a poor reason for predicting its retention across subsequent cases of scientific change 
that range over more comprehensive data sets.   
 Rutherford’s nuclear model of the atom was better than older models in virtue of its 
capacity to explain the alpha-particle scattering data. Whatever model of progress we adopt it is 
going to appeal to factors that the constructive empiricist would consider of mere pragmatic 
value. Despite a wealth of new discoveries and models, physics retains the opinion that atoms 
have massive nuclei. But, again, the pragmatic value of certain identifiable aspects of the nuclear 
model, relative to the early data set, is no reason for predicting their subsequent retention. 
 
Second, for the record, I’m with John Norton in having an optimistic, Pollyanna view, about 
science. Science is providing increasingly truth-like models and theories; whether we should 
describe those theories as approximately true is a less tractable, and perhaps less important, 
question for realists. 
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Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Let me begin by saying that the workshop was enormously useful to me, as I received 
extremely valuable input from a wide variety of people in a wide variety of forms concerning 
both my own ongoing research into underdetermination and my forthcoming SEP entry on the 
subject.  I could not hope to summarize or acknowledge all or even just the most important 
feedback I received and so I will not try to do so.  What I will do is try to address in somewhat 
more detail questions that came up at the workshop, particularly in regard to my own work, 
whose discussion is not already reflected in the papers as they were originally presented.   
For my purposes the most useful result of the conference discussions was to highlight 
both the difficulties and the importance (each of which already struck me as considerable) of 
distinguishing the varieties of inductive evidence we have in support of various kinds of 
scientific claims and the plausibility of the challenges that can be raised to those forms of 
evidence (two issues that came up in nearly all of the talks that were given).  I am sympathetic to 
John Norton’s suggestion that inductive inferences always involve a gamble of some kind and 
that the central issue is just how likely or plausible it is that whatever could defeat the gamble 
(e.g. an unrepresentative sample, an unconceived alternative explanation) really obtains in a 
given case.  But I am much less sanguine than many other workshop participants seem to be 
about the idea that this is more or less all that there is to say, and that the threat of 
underdetermination can therefore only be assessed locally or on a case-by-case basis.  This is 
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because I think that while we are pretty good at assessing our degree of risk reliably in everyday 
cases of abductive or eliminative inferences, and perhaps other kinds of inductive inferences as 
well, I think we have convincing evidence that we are pretty poor at doing so in the context of 
scientific theorizing.  For unconceived alternatives, our usual practice seems to rely on 
something like an availability heuristic:  if we can’t think of a theoretical alternative that is well-
confirmed by the evidence, then we assume it is unlikely that one exists.  (I discuss this inference 
in slightly more detail in “Scientific Realism, The Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis:  
Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?”, forthcoming in BJPS.)  
Again, I think this heuristic is reliable in most everyday contexts of eliminative inference but not 
in most scientific ones, especially in fundamental theorizing (where it matters most).  And John’s 
musings about the credibility of unconceived alternatives in various scientific contexts (quantum 
gravity, planetary cosmology, the periodic table) seems to me to exemplify rather than resolve 
the problem.  As John and Greg each suggest independently, I am open to the idea that both 
projections and abductions can be vulnerable to the problem of unconceived alternatives, and I 
certainly agree with John’s assessments that “the progression of inductive inferences on fossils 
from the 16th to the 20th century is…a progression from weaker to stronger inductive inferences 
with correspondingly less inductive risk”, and that in the particular case I discussed, “the 
abductions happened to be more troubled by them than did the projections, which are essentially 
immune to them”, but if these judgments rely on nothing more than strong intuitions about the 
relative safety of the various inferences in question, then I think we are in deep trouble. 
My own interest in the case of fossilization was prompted initially by the desire to 
understand why in some cases of what is undoubtedly fundamental scientific theorizing (e.g. the 
hypothesis of organic fossil origins) but not others, it seems a mere skeptical possibility that 
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there remain unconceived theoretical alternatives that are well-confirmed by the available 
evidence.  I think identifying the projective evidence that accumulated throughout the 19th and 
especially the 20th century in support of the hypothesis helps explain that sense, but the more 
important question is whether it does anything to justify our confidence, and I do not see how it 
can unless we allow that there are systematic epistemic differences (though perhaps only 
differences of degree) between the kinds of evidence we now have in support of the hypothesis 
of organic origins and that in support of earlier accounts of fossil origins, or in support of the 
caloric theory of heat, or in support of a given theory of quantum gravity.  I certainly do not 
mean to suggest that a systematic evaluation of the threat posed by unconceived alternatives in a 
given case must involve a simple dichotomy between abductive and projective forms of 
inductive support:  as Greg notes, I am sympathetic to the idea that there is a continuum of risk 
from unconceived alternatives associated with different kinds of inductive inferences, and there 
are surely a wide variety of features of the background context that impact our vulnerability to 
the problem of unconceived alternatives in a given set of circumstances, from the availability of 
such projective evidence to our relative familiarity with the objects and relations making up the 
domain about which we are theorizing and presumably much more besides.  But I think we must 
now set out to explore those features and the relationships among them, for unless there are 
systematic distinctions to be drawn between the features of different kinds of cases and the kinds 
of evidence we have in support of various scientific claims, and unless there is something quite 
general to be said about the respective vulnerability of those forms of evidence to various 
inductive infirmities, we are left with nothing but strong intuitions about cases, which I’ve 
suggested are demonstrably not worth much in the case of scientific theories.  Those who are 
dismissive about the prospects of underdetermination will need something besides their (or even 
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our!) intuitions about particular cases to convince us, and those who are enthusiastic about the 
prospect of widespread underdetermination will need to make sure they haven’t just overplayed 
their hands. 
Although this part of my work is usually characterized as challenging scientific realism, I 
hope this illustrates why it can equally well be seen as a contribution to the realist cause:  viz., as 
an effort to identify the circumstances in which realists might really be justified in regarding our 
theories (or parts, aspects, elements, or characteristics of those theories) as accurate descriptions 
of otherwise inaccessible domains of nature.  The point all along has been to get us to pay 
attention to the kind(s) of evidence we have in support of a given theoretical claim rather than 
what the claim is about or who is making it. 
Furthermore, I think there is an intriguing connection between the idea that our intuitions 
about inductive risk are unreliable when deployed in the context of theoretical science and what I 
see as the central issue in John Manchak’s talk.  I share John’s frustration with the lack of any 
general answer to the question of what constitutes a “physically reasonable” spacetime.  As 
emerged in the discussion, in making such judgments I think we (and here I mean physicists as 
well as philosophers) rely far too quickly and easily on physical intuitions gleaned from (or 
evolved in response to) our experiences with rocks, trees, and pools of water, and that any 
warrant we have for extending these intuitions to, for example, the structure of spacetime, is 
extremely weak.  Without any convincing general account or defense of our grounds for 
dismissing hypotheses as “physically unreasonable”, the prospect of underdetermination by 
serious scientific alternatives looms, of course, commensurately larger.   
(Much of the further discussion of papers in the workshop’s second half, particularly 
concerning empirical equivalents and the “identical rivals” response (that two putatively distinct 
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hypotheses are really notational variants of a single hypothesis) seemed to me to fit naturally 
with my own published views (e.g. in Chapter 1 of Exceeding Our Grasp and in “Refusing the 
Devil’s Bargain:  What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously” (2001 
Philosophy of Science, 68 (PSA Proceedings): S1-S12) and so I will not comment further on it 
here.) 
Let me conclude by trying to give an answer to John’s question about the motivations, 
rather than the arguments, sustaining various sides of the philosophical controversies 
surrounding underdetermination.  I have a slight advantage over some workshop participants in 
that I saw the talk by Wolfgang Pietsch at &HPS2 that got John wondering about this and had a 
chance to talk to him afterwards about it.  What John seemed most centrally worried about 
initially was not whether and how various claims of underdetermination might be defended, but 
what makes people think it would or wouldn’t be a good thing if they can (or cannot) be.  
Oversimplifying, the Pietsch talk concluded by saying “hurray for underdetermination” because 
it encourages creativity, variety, and heterogeneity in our scientific inquiry, and this got John 
wondering, I think, about whether different standards of value concerning the scientific 
enterprise are lurking in the background.  People who think of science as impressive and 
interesting because it has enabled us to learn about aspects and features of the world that our 
predecessors could only dream about will see the prospect of underdetermination as 
threatening—as a problem or challenge that makes the central goal and source of value for 
scientific inquiry harder to achieve.  But one might instead see science as valuable and 
interesting in the way that art is often taken to be:  as a fundamental expression of human 
creativity and virtuosity.  On this view the products of science are valuable not primarily because 
they tell us about the world (even if they do) but instead because, like paintings and musical 
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compositions, they are some of the most curious, complex, wonderful, and fascinating products 
of the human intellect.  If that is their primary source of value, then the more of them the better, 
so all hail underdetermination, a condition which, when recognized, drives us to generate even 
more of these creative marvels.  After all, who would wish for there to be fewer interesting 
movies, songs, or paintings in the world?  (The version of the query in John’s written remarks 
here seems less concerned to distinguish these questions about standards of value from claims 
about the accomplishments of science, but I think this has again invited people to start talking 
about what theses they think they can defend, rather than what motivates their interest and 
sympathies in the dispute.) 
 If I’ve got John’s question right, I’m afraid that my answer will disappoint:  I think this 
difference is real, but I don’t think it is what drives allegiance in the disputes over 
underdetermination.  I will take myself as a case in point.  My own view is that scientific theories 
are indeed marvels of human creativity, but that their ability to serve as instrumental tools for 
getting around in the world and addressing our practical needs is what is most incredible about 
them (after all in science but not art, the world pushes back).  It is further reflection on the 
evidence for the problem of unconceived alternatives embedded in the historical record of 
scientific inquiry itself that leads me to doubt whether our theories manage to do this by simply 
reporting to us how things stand in otherwise inaccessible domains of nature.  Thus, if there is a 
non-argumentative affinity serving as the wellspring of my own sense that some claims of 
underdetermination are important, it is probably an appreciation of the sort of contingency that 
seems to permeate the historical record of scientific inquiry and what that contingency seems to 
reveal about the limits of our ability to limn the world’s depths in particular epistemic 
circumstances, not a general enthusiasm for fostering more creative scientific theorizing rather 
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than less.  Of course, upon further reflection such contingency might not seem so surprising after 
all:  there is little reason to think that the cognitive abilities and conceptual categories of 
creatures selected for prowess in finding food, shelter, and mates out on the savannah will also 
be especially well-suited for uncovering the structure of matter, or of spacetime, or for 
unraveling the deep history of the cosmos. 
